United Nations S/2013/54

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 January 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 7 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mr. James Squire has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

13-21764 (E) 290113

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United Nations S/2013/55

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 January 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 10 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mr. Robert Harrison has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

13-21758 (E) 280113

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United Nations S/2013/56

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 25 January 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with the request of the Security Council in paragraph 5 of resolution 2073 (2012) concerning the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia, I have the honour to transmit the attached report (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

13-21797 (E) 300113

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Annex

Report on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2073 (2012)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2073 (2012). In that resolution, the Council requested the African Union to keep it regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and to report to the Council, through the provision of written reports, 60 days after the date of the resolution.

2. The present report provides a brief update on the main political and security developments in Somalia during the period under review. It also covers the activities undertaken by AMISOM in pursuit of its mandate and concludes with observations on the way forward.

II. Main political and related developments

3. As the Security Council is aware, Somalia entered into a new political dispensation when, in September 2012, through a credible, but arduous, democratic process, the new Federal Parliament elected a new President, thereby constitutionally ending the eight years of transitional arrangements that had been established with the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter, in 2004, and the complementary Djibouti process. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was formally inaugurated in Mogadishu on 16 September 2012. Thereafter, he outlined the six immediate priorities of his Government, namely, security, national reconciliation, social service delivery, public financial management, economic development and justice. He also stressed that he would reach out to armed opposition groups and continue dialogue with Somaliland. On 6 October 2012, he nominated Abdi Farah Shirdon as Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet were endorsed by the Parliament on 13 November 2012. Since then, the Somali authorities have taken a number of steps in implementation of the priorities they have outlined.

4. In November 2012, the Federal Parliament finalized and adopted a four-year strategic plan, including its internal working regulations. It also established 15 parliamentary committees with elected chairpersons, vice-chairpersons and secretaries. The parliamentary committees, three of which are chaired by female parliamentarians, will go a long way in improving the effectiveness of the Parliament in discharging its legislative and oversight functions. Furthermore, the Parliament has identified 11 projects aimed at enhancing its capacity, including the establishment of a functional secretariat. It has outlined its legislative agenda, which has been shared with the Government. This includes a number of priority legislations, together with their timelines, that the Federal Government has to table before the Parliament in accordance with the Provisional Federal Constitution. Furthermore, some articles in the Provisional Federal Constitution have been

suspended, notably the establishment of an upper house, a political development which is being contested by Puntland.

5. On 13 December 2012, the Prime Minister, in consultation with the President, members of the Parliament and representatives of Somali civil society, appointed five Ministers of State and 20 Deputy Ministers. This was in response to concerns that the Cabinet was not inclusive.

6. The new Government is taking concrete steps to revitalize or establish governance institutions and appoint the required leadership to administer them. Consequently, the leadership and management of financial institutions, such as the Central Bank, the Office of the Accountant-General and the Office of the Auditor-General, are being restructured in line with the six-pillar policy of the Government. A similar process is under way for other institutions. The Government is now tightening its oversight and control on public revenue generation and expenditure in order to enhance transparency and accountability. Further reorganization is also expected in the civil service to bring on board the required permanent secretaries, directors-general, directors and ambassadors in the Foreign Service.

7. The Government has started to work with the existing interim regional administrations in south-central Somalia. Specifically, it is facilitating a Reconciliation Conference that will bring together the elders, leaders and intellectuals from six regions, namely, Lower Juba, Middle Juba, Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Lower Shabelle. The Conference is expected to agree on modalities for the establishment of local, regional and state administrations, using a bottom-up approach.

8. On 6 December 2012, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Joint Committee for the Grand Stabilization of South-Central Somalia met in Addis Ababa to enhance coordination and review membership of the Committee. At the end of the meeting, a memorandum of understanding was adopted expanding the membership of the Committee (that initially comprised representatives of Ethiopia, Kenya and Jubaland) to include the Federal Government of Somalia, which is now to serve as the Chair of the Committee. Following the adoption of that memorandum of understanding, a high-level delegation from the Government visited Kismaayo in December 2012 for a meeting with the interim administration. The two sides agreed to form a new administration based on the country's Constitution and discussed the integration of Ras Kamboni brigade into the Somali National Security Forces.

9. Considerable efforts have been made to reach out to Somalia's neighbours and strengthen the country's bilateral and multilateral relations. In this respect, President Mohamud paid working visits to all the member States of IGAD. Outside the region, President Mohamud has also visited Turkey. On her part, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fawzia Aden, visited London, where she was received by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, William Hague, and with whom she discussed the planned London Conference on Somalia, to be held in May 2013.

III. Security situation

10. The security situation has continued to improve thanks to the sustained efforts of the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM. During the reporting period, the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM further expanded their areas of control. However, a number of challenges remain, which require continued efforts and enhanced support to free the rest of the country from the control of Al-Shabaab.

11. In Sector 1 (Banadir, Lower and Middle Shabelle), the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM forces secured the town of Jawhar, 90 km north-west of Mogadishu, on 9 December 2012. The town, which is also the capital of Middle Shabelle, has served as a major base for Al-Shabaab since it was pushed out of other areas in south-central Somalia.

12. Significant progress has also been made in Sector 2 (Lower and Middle Juba) during the reporting period. The Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM forces continued to consolidate security in and around Kismaayo, where they have deprived Al-Shabaab of revenue from seaport taxation, custom duties and smuggling of contraband, notably the import and export of charcoal and sugar. In November 2012, the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM forces secured the town of Bulo Xaji, a critical supply route. Preparations are under way to expand the operations of the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM forces to Jilib and Jamaame.

13. In Sector 3 (Gedo, Bay and Bakool), the existing 1,050 AMISOM troops will be joined by an additional 1,500 troops, who are now advancing from Afgoye to Baidoa, with the aim of connecting the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions to the Bay and Bakool regions. At the time of finalizing the present report, those forces had moved beyond Lego village, which is situated 104 km from Baidoa.

14. In Sector 4 (Galguduud and Hiraan), Djiboutian troops have now fully deployed. AMISOM forces, with the support of the Somali National Security Forces and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, continue to consolidate security in key towns and villages. This is a critical area as it is being used by Al-Shabaab as a transit route towards Puntland and other northern parts of the country.

15. The AMISOM formed police units, together with the Somali Police Force, are now conducting 24-hour patrols in Mogadishu. The formed police units are also providing VIP escorts and protection to AMISOM personnel and are increasingly taking responsibility for security during major public functions. In addition to contributing to relieving the AMISOM forces from performing policing activities, such as escorts and public order duties, the formed police units are also helping to restore public confidence and security in Mogadishu. On their part, the individual police officers are continuing to mentor and advise their Somali Police Force counterparts. Thanks to the escort and security provided by the formed police units, the individual police officers are now able to reach out to more police stations, thus enhancing their mentoring and advisory functions to the Somali Police Force.

16. Although the combined Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM operations have created tangible security gains and have significantly weakened Al-Shabaab, the extremist group continues to pose a major threat and still retains the ability to strike, especially through improvised explosive devices, targeted assassinations and suicide attacks. Al-Shabaab has melted into the local communities and relocated

much of its manpower and equipment to areas such as Middle Juba, Baraawe in Lower Shabelle, the northern parts of Middle Shabelle, parts of the Bakool region, Buulobarde in Hiraan, Galguduud regions and Golis Mountain (Puntland), where the Somali National Security Forces and allied militia have a limited presence. They have also established a presence in some parts of Somaliland, and continue to access weapons and other logistics through the seaports of Baraawe, Ceeldheere, Cadale and Xarardheere.

17. Al-Shabaab skilfully exploits clan differences in an effort to boost its ranks. It also resorts to methods, such as extortion of businesses, establishment of illegal checkpoints and increased linkages with criminal networks, to fund its operations. While there have so far been no clear linkages between pirates and Al-Shabaab, there are concerns that this may change as Al-Shabaab moves into the piracy heartlands, such as Xarardheere and the seaports of Hobiyo, Ceeldheere and Cadale, as it becomes more financially desperate.

18. Al-Shabaab enjoys the support of a core group of around 400 foreign fighters that move around Somalia and provide mentorship to its fighters and extremist jihadists from the region and beyond. There are indications that Al-Shabaab has intensified its outreach in the region, attempting to establish links with local extremist groups. It continues to recruit fighters in neighbouring countries, train them and facilitate the return of those who want to wage war against their homeland, as demonstrated by: the recent spate of attacks in Kenya; the arrest on 7 December 2012 in Sudan's Al-Dandar Wildlife Park, in the central state of Sennar, of 25 Islamist extremists who were training with a view to joining Al-Shabaab; and Ethiopia's arrest, on 1 January 2013, of 15 suspected militants trained by Al-Shabaab who were plotting attacks.

IV. AMISOM deployment

19. With the full deployment of the Djiboutian contingent in Sector 4 (Beledweyne), which was completed at the end of November 2012, the strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel now stands at 17,709. This number comprises 5,432 troops from Burundi, 960 from Djibouti, 4,652 from Kenya and 6,223 from Uganda. The Sierra Leone battalion of 850 is now due to deploy in February and March 2013, after which Kenya will reduce its contribution by one battalion. There are 81 staff officers from Burundi, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia. There are also 81 individual police officers from Burundi, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zimbabwe, as well as two formed police units of 140 police elements each from Nigeria and Uganda.

20. On 1 November 2012, the African Union appointed a new Special Representative for Somalia and Head of AMISOM in the person of Mahamat Salah Annadif of Chad. A former African Union Representative to the European Union in Brussels, Ambassador Annadif has extensive diplomatic and public service experience, having served, in particular, as his country's Foreign Minister. He replaced the previous Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra. Ambassador Annadif assumed his post in Mogadishu on 12 December 2012.

21. In its resolution 2073 (2012), adopted on 7 November 2012, the Security Council decided, on an exceptional basis and owing to the unique character of the Mission, to extend the United Nations logistical support package for AMISOM civilian personnel for a further 50 civilian personnel, on a temporary basis to be reviewed after the strategic reviews by the United Nations and the African Union. As a follow-up, the Commission has developed a Concept Paper for the deployment of 50 civilians who will be deployed in the four Sectors in support of the ongoing AMISOM operations. Those civilians will also work with local government officials and community groups in the recovered areas to facilitate the extension of State authority, by ensuring effective linkage with the Government in Mogadishu, and the provision of basic services to the population, especially through the implementation of quick-impact projects. They will also perform other key functions, including provision of support to local reconciliation and promotion of human rights, and will support initial steps regarding security sector reform, including the management of disengaged fighters.

22. The Commission has commenced the recruitment process for those posts, and is also considering the possibility of utilizing available rosters to identify and facilitate the speedy recruitment and deployment of the required personnel. At the same time, the Commission has requested the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia to put in place the required logistical arrangements to facilitate the deployment of civilian presence in all Sectors.

23. At its 337th meeting, the African Union Peace and Security Council requested the Security Council to authorize a four-month technical rollover of the United Nations support package, as provided for by resolution 2036 (2012) of 22 February 2012, with the inclusion of additional support regarding the civilian and maritime components of the Mission, to take into account urgent needs arising from the realities on the ground. Such a technical rollover was to be granted pending the completion of the AMISOM Strategic Review, which is addressed below.

24. On 31 October 2012, the Security Council adopted resolution 2072 (2012), through which it extended the mandate of AMISOM until 7 November 2012, noting the exceptional circumstances in New York City arising from Hurricane Sandy and recognizing, in those exceptional circumstances, the need for a short extension of the mandate of AMISOM. On 7 November 2012, the Council adopted resolution 2073 (2012), authorizing the member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 7 March 2013. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide the logistical support package for AMISOM, as referred to in its relevant resolutions.

V. AMISOM support to the Federal Government of Somalia

25. During the reporting period, AMISOM components (substantive civilian, police and military) undertook a number of activities in support of the Federal Government of Somalia. They cover stabilization and governance in the liberated areas, gender issues, the management of disengaged fighters, support to the Somali National Security Forces and capacity-building for the Somali civil service.

Support to stabilization and governance in the liberated areas

26. Further to IGAD efforts in support to the stabilization of areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, the Government, in collaboration with AMISOM, organized a workshop on the theme "Getting the stabilization programme forward", on 12 and 13 December 2012, at the AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu. The workshop was attended by senior government officials, including the Office of the President, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Internal Security.

27. The workshop resolved that the Government would set the priorities for the recently liberated areas, which would include the consolidation of security, local reconciliation and the provision of basic services. On its part, AMISOM pledged to support the Government in extending its authority in all the newly recovered areas, in providing peace dividends through the implementation of quick-impact projects, and in facilitating access to humanitarian assistance in coordination with the Government.

Support to the Female Caucus of the Federal Parliament

28. During the reporting period, the AMISOM Gender Unit undertook activities aimed at enhancing the role of women in the new political dispensation and advancing gender issues in the implementation of the mandate of AMISOM. In this respect, the Unit organized a televised and radio broadcast debate in Mogadishu, on 12 November 2012, on how to empower Somali women across the country and how they can better engage elders and politicians. The event, which brought together elders, academicians, female activists and parliamentarians, as well as religious leaders, discussed the role of women in politics and in the post-conflict period. The meeting also discussed challenges such as the lack of education and the misuse of religion and radicalization.

29. In December 2012, the AMISOM Gender Unit also convened a needs assessment workshop for female members of the Federal Parliament in Kampala, Uganda. The goal of the workshop, attended by female parliamentarians from countries of the region, was to assess the needs of female parliamentarians, while also providing a networking opportunity between them and their counterparts from the region. It also provided a platform for the sharing of experiences and lessons learned. On that basis, the workshop agreed on the formation of a Caucus to implement an Action Plan to promote the agenda on women's issues, starting with gender mainstreaming of all future legislations, including those relating to governance and stabilization in Somalia.

30. The AMISOM Gender Unit is engaged with relevant partners, such as the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS and the United Nations Population Fund. The objective is to explore the possibility of partnership and coordination on matters of priority relevant to their respective mandates and jurisdictions in Mogadishu and in the newly recovered areas.

Support for the management of disengaged fighters

31. Somalia and AMISOM continue to be confronted with several caseloads of disengaged fighters. AMISOM is currently holding 249 voluntarily disengaged fighters in Mogadishu, while the Federal Government is holding an estimated 1,500 former fighters. Most of those held by the Government were either captured

or arrested by the Somali National Security Forces or by AMISOM. The voluntarily disengaged fighters held by AMISOM are persons who have defected from Al-Shabaab for various reasons. There are also a large number of defections that have not been recorded, because some of the fighters were previously members of clan militias and have now blended back into their clans. This group is of particular concern because, if given monetary incentives, they could be remobilized by Al-Shabaab.

32. In an effort to build the capacity of the Government to manage the disengaged fighters, AMISOM, in collaboration with the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and other partners, organized a training session for AMISOM and Somali National Security Forces commanders in Nairobi from 4 to 6 December 2012. The training focused on how to handle disengaging fighters, on international humanitarian law, on human rights and on child rights, among others. The Government and AMISOM are also working together on appropriate programmes that would present more sustainable and durable solutions for managing those defectors who have returned to their clan militias.

Support to the Somali National Security Forces

33. It should be recalled that before the end of the Transition, the Commission organized a series of workshops on the Somali security sector empowerment that led to the development of a concept of operations for the mechanism to be put in place in order to facilitate the effective integration of the regional and allied forces into the Somali National Security Forces and the establishment of a unified command and control architecture. The document has since been submitted to the new Somali authorities for review, update and endorsement before it is submitted to the Peace and Security Council and, subsequently, to the Security Council. It is the expectation of the African Union that the international community will provide the required support, for this is critical to the achievement of sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.

34. Somalia's armed forces currently consist of senior officers in need of refresher training and a large number of new recruits with limited or no training at all in international humanitarian law. As part of its efforts aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Somali National Security Forces, AMISOM, working in close collaboration with the Government and supported by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, convened a workshop on international humanitarian law for 41 officers in Djibouti from 29 to 31 October 2012. The workshop: provided an opportunity to demonstrate the importance and relevance of international humanitarian law and human rights; promoted understanding of international humanitarian law, in particular the essential rules of law that are relevant to the officers' operational functions; and identified gaps and challenges to compliance with international humanitarian law in the context of the conflict in Somalia.

35. At the end of the workshop, participants adopted a plan of action, which included an implementation strategy to ensure compliance by the Somali National Security Forces with international humanitarian law. Follow-up activities were also agreed upon, including: the conduct of similar training at all appropriate command and staff levels; the conduct of training-of-trainers workshops on international humanitarian law; the development of relevant policy and necessary law reforms;

the establishment of an international humanitarian law commission; parliamentary ratification of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and of the Convention of the Rights of the Child as committed to in its universal periodic review report of 2012; and the strengthening of rule of law institutions, including the military courts system.

36. Between December 2012 and January 2013, AMISOM trained 80 Somali Police Force officers in criminal investigation. The training, which took place at the General Kahiye Police Academy in Mogadishu, will be extended to an additional 80 police officers.

37. Furthermore, AMISOM police, in collaboration with the Djibouti National Police and the Italian Carabinieri, will launch, starting from 17 January 2013, a training programme for 200 personnel from the Somali Police Force on public order management at the Djibouti National Police Academy. The course will go a long way in building the capacity of the Somali Police Force in the maintenance of law and order. The African Union wishes to pay tribute to the Governments of Djibouti and Italy for their support in facilitating the development and conduct of this training programme.

Capacity-building for the Somali civil service

38. In January 2013, AMISOM launched a series of training workshops for the Somali civil service. The training involved 120 public servants, including secretaries, protocol officers and senior-level administrators. It is funded by the Government of Italy and is facilitated by the University of South Africa Graduate School of Business Leadership. This activity is part of the implementation of the plan of action agreed upon between the Somali Government and the African Union following a needs assessment workshop held in Kampala, Uganda, in March 2012. Since then, AMISOM has carried out a number of capacity-building activities, including facilitating two weeks of on-the-job training and mentorship in Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda, providing requisite working tools/equipment and renovating office spaces.

VI. AMISOM strategic review

39. At its 337th meeting, the African Union Peace and Security Council expressed full support to the decision of the Commission to undertake a strategic review of AMISOM and the implementation of its mandate, with a view to determining how best the Mission can further contribute to the stabilization of Somalia and the successful implementation of the priorities set by the Somali Government, in close coordination with an empowered and restructured Somali National Defence and Security Sector. The decision to undertake the review was made against the background of the significant political and security progress achieved in Somalia over the past months and, accordingly, the need to adjust the operations of AMISOM.

40. The review process was launched in December 2012 and is being carried out by a team of experienced civilian, military and police officers. The exercise has involved extensive consultations with the Somali authorities and other stakeholders. Consultations have also been carried out with the AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries, other interested countries and IGAD, as well as with

international partners. The process will be completed at the end of January 2013 and the outcome submitted to the Peace and Security Council for its action as appropriate.

41. In undertaking the review, the Commission was mindful of the need to closely coordinate its efforts with the United Nations, as the latter is also carrying out a similar exercise regarding the future role of the United Nations in Somalia. It was against this background that the African Union requested the United Nations to lead the review process. Unfortunately, owing to its own constraints, the United Nations was not able to make available the Secretary-General's Military Adviser, as requested by the African Union. All the same, the team carrying out the AMISOM review has consulted regularly with the United Nations. Furthermore, relevant officials of the African Union Commission, including the Commissioner for Peace and Security, have held extensive meetings with the team working on the United Nations review. It is important to ensure that, as much as possible, the two reviews converge in order to facilitate a coordinated approach to the challenges facing Somalia and more effective international support.

VII. Observations

42. Somalia is continuing on the path of political progress since the advent of the new administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Within the framework of his Government's six-pillar strategy, the President has provided clear direction on international community engagement with Somalia within the context of the new political dispensation in the country. I encourage the Somali stakeholders to remain steadfast and to continue to put the interest of their country above any other consideration, as the tasks ahead will be even more complex and demanding.

43. The efforts of the Somali Government to build strong institutions and embark on the path to recovery should be fully supported by the international community, in order to maintain the current momentum. Such support should be based on the priorities outlined by the Somali authorities and be commensurate with the immense needs on the ground. I reiterate the call by the African Union Peace and Security Council on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission to take steps to contribute actively to post-conflict reconstruction and development in Somalia. On its part, the African Union Commission is planning to include Somalia in the list of pilot countries covered by the African Solidarity Initiative, which was launched in July 2012, with a view to mobilizing, from within the continent, resources for African countries emerging from conflict. Furthermore, steps should be taken to support the restructuring and empowerment of the Somali National Security Forces, including through the supply of stipends, equipment, weapons and ammunitions. As stressed by the Peace and Security Council, this will require, within a transparent and orderly framework, the lifting of the arms embargo as it relates to the Somali National Security Forces, while maintaining it against non-State actors.

44. The African Union also notes with satisfaction the gains that continue to be made by the Somali and AMISOM forces, reiterates its appreciation to the AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries for their unwavering commitment and the sacrifices they have made. The courage and steadfastness of the Somali forces, as well as of the women and men serving under AMISOM, who are working under extreme difficulties to further the cause of peace and stability in Somalia, is

applauded by the African Union. The ongoing review of the Mission will enable the Commission to determine how best AMISOM can continue to support the stabilization process of Somalia. The African Union would also like to express its appreciation to Ethiopia, Chair of IGAD, and the other members of the regional organization for their role and outstanding contribution to the quest for peace, stability and reconciliation in Somalia. The African Union thanks the United Nations, including the Security Council, for its continued support to its efforts in Somalia.

United Nations S/2013/57

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 25 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, issued on 24 January 2013, with regard to Security Council resolution 2087 (2013) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Sin** Son Ho
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-21770 (E) 280113

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Annex to the letter dated 25 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Democratic People's Republic of Korea National Defence Commission Issues Statement Refuting Security Council resolution 2087 (2013)

Pyongyang, 24 January

Our successful launch of satellite Kwangmyongsong 3-2 was a great jubilee in the history of the nation, as it placed the nation's dignity and honour on the highest plane and was a spectacular success in the efforts being made to develop space for peaceful purposes recognized by the world.

The world people who love justice and value conscience unanimously rejoice, as if it were their own, over the signal success made by our country, not a big one, by its own efforts.

Even the space institutions of a hostile country, accustomed to expressing repugnance towards others, could not but recognize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's successful satellite launch for peaceful purposes, from a low-profile stance.

This being a hard reality, the United States of America, at the outset of the year, termed our satellite launch a "long-range missile launch", a "wanton violation" of United Nations resolutions and a "blatant challenge" to world peace and security in a bid to build up public opinion on this.

Finally, the United States prodded the Security Council into cooking up a new resolution on tightening sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The keynote of the resolution was worked out through backstage dealing with the United States as a main player, and it was adopted by the Security Council with blind hand-raising by its member nations. This goes to clearly prove that the hostile policy of the United States towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has entered a dangerous new phase. This shows, at the same time, that those big countries, which are obliged to take the lead in building a fair world order, are abandoning without hesitation even elementary principles, under the influence of the arbitrary and high-handed practices of the United States, failing to come to their senses.

Moreover, this also indicates that the Security Council, which should regard it as its mission to guarantee the sovereign rights and security of its member nations, has turned into a defunct marionette, an international body on which no hope can be pinned. The National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea solemnly declares the following with regard to the adoption of the entirely unreasonable resolution on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

1. We totally reject all the illegal resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea adopted by the Security Council

We have never recognized any form of the base resolutions tightening sanctions that are cooked up by hostile forces to encroach upon the sovereignty of

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Sovereignty is what keeps a country and nation alive. The country and the nation without sovereignty are more dead than alive. The satellite launch was the exercise of an independent right pertaining to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as its legitimate sovereignty recognized by international law. Therefore, the United States and those countries which launched satellites before have neither justification nor reason to find fault with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's satellite launch. They are making a brigandish assertion that what they launched were satellites but that what another country launched was a long-range missile. They are seriously mistaken if they think this assertion can work in the bright world of today. The United States should clearly know that the times have changed and so have the army and the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Along with nationwide efforts to defend its sovereignty, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will continue launching peaceful satellites into outer space one after another.

2. As the hostile policy of the United States towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has entered a more dangerous phase, overall efforts should be directed towards the denuclearization of the big powers, including the United States, rather than the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula

The biggest threat to peace and security on the Korean peninsula is the hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea being pursued by all kinds of dishonest forces, including the United States as well as the huge nuclear armed forces of the United States that back the policy. The army and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea drew the final conclusion that only when the denuclearization of the world is realized on a perfect and preferential basis, including the denuclearization of the United States, will it be possible to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and ensure the peace and security of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The United States is taking the lead in encroaching upon the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its allies are siding with it, and the Security Council has been reduced to an organization bereft of impartiality and balance. In this situation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot but declare that there will no longer exist the six-party talks and the 19 September joint statement. No dialogue on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will be possible in the future, even though there may be dialogues and negotiations on ensuring peace and security in the region, including on the Korean peninsula.

3. We will launch an all-out action to foil the hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea being pursued by the United States and those dishonest forces following the United States, and safeguard the sovereignty of the country and the nation

The Security Council resolution on expanding sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was adopted on the initiative of the United States, represents the most dangerous phase of the hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The army and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will never remain onlookers to such happenings in which the sovereignty of the nation is encroached upon and the supreme interests of the country are violated. In the prevailing situation, the army and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will turn out in an all-out action to defend

its sovereignty, which is more precious than their own lives, and will frustrate the moves of the United States and its allies to isolate and stifle the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The drive to build an economic power that is being pushed forward by the army and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the effort to conquer space, which has entered a new phase, and the endeavours to bolster the deterrence in order to safeguard the country and defend its security will all be orientated towards the purpose of winning in the all-out action for foiling the United States and all other hostile forces' manoeuvres.

We do not hide the fact that a variety of satellites and long-range rockets which will be launched by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea one after another and that a nuclear test of a higher level will be carried out by it in the upcoming all-out action, a new phase of the anti-United States struggle that has lasted century after century and that will target the United States, the sworn enemy of the Korean people.

Settling accounts with the United States needs to be done with force, not with words, as it regards jungle law as the rule of its survival. The world will clearly see how the army and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea punish all kinds of hostile forces and will emerge as the final victor while following the just road of defending its sovereignty, convinced of the justice of their cause.

United Nations S/2013/58

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 23 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that the United Kingdom has, since Monday, 14 January, been providing logistical support to the military effort in Mali, undertaken pursuant to the request of the Transitional Government of Mali.

This support is in the form of two C17 transport aircraft, following a request by the French Government. Our Ambassador in Bamako has confirmed the provision of this support to the Transitional Government of Mali, and this has been welcomed.

I would be grateful if you could have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mark **Lyall Grant**

13-21778 (E) 280113

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United Nations S/2013/59

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 January 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 2075 (2012), in which the Council requested that I continue to inform it of progress in the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), and to bring to its attention any violation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011 between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area (S/2011/384, annex). The present report also provides an update on progress made in the implementation of the additional tasks mandated to UNISFA under Council resolution 2024 (2011) related to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. In addition, the report provides an update on the situation in Abyei and on the deployment and operations of UNISFA since my previous report on the matter issued on 23 November 2012 (S/2012/890).

II. Security situation

2. The security situation in the Abyei Area has remained calm but volatile. The force of between 120 and 150 Sudanese oil police remained deployed inside the Diffra oil complex, in the northern part of the Abyei Area. Its presence and activities, while limited to the oil complex, are in violation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011, as well as Security Council resolutions 1990 (2011), 2032 (2011), 2046 (2012), 2047 (2012) and 2075 (2012).

3. As mentioned in my previous report, a group of approximately 35 men armed with light weapons, entered the Abyei Area on 6 November and stationed itself in the vicinity of Um Khariet and Dumboloya. UNISFA leadership was informed that the group, principally Misseriya in composition, is affiliated with the Justice and Equality Movement and has been fighting in Darfur and Southern Kordofan alongside the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North. Although, the group declared its intention to continue fighting the Government from within the Abyei Area, it also expressed its willingness to engage in talks with the Government of the Sudan.

4. Upon the request of the UNISFA Head of Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Tadesse Werede Tesfay, the group agreed to withdraw from the Abyei Area. In December, approximately 25 of the men withdrew from the Area.

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The remaining 10 members, have settled in the south-eastern part of the Area, near the border with South Sudan. In order to monitor the group's movements and protect the local civilian population, UNISFA continues to maintain a strong military presence around them and is continuing to request their complete withdrawal from the Area.

5. The 2012-2013 annual seasonal migration of Misseriya nomads through the Abyei Area is well under way and is continuing peacefully. Approximately 50,000 nomads, along with approximately 1.2 million livestock, are currently present inside the Area. The nomads have reached the Kiir/Bahr el-Arab River in the western corridor and have migrated as far as Todach in the central corridor. The nomads have also begun crossing the border with Unity State in South Sudan, along the eastern corridor.

6. In coordination with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), a UNISFA delegation travelled from 26 to 29 November to the South Sudan border States of Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, Warrap and Unity to discuss, with the State governors, traditional community leaders and UNMISS, the necessary preparations to ensure a peaceful migration. The State governors welcomed the steps UNISFA was taking to prevent intercommunal confrontation and agreed that talks between the two communities were critical to that effort. However, the governors of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap States expressed serious security concerns in respect of the entry of armed nomads into South Sudan.

7. On 14 December 2012, in close coordination with UNMISS, UNISFA facilitated a meeting between the leaders of the Ngok Dinka in the Abyei Area and the Twic Dinka in Warrap State to discuss measures that could be undertaken to ensure a peaceful and orderly migration. However, the meeting was not successful and resulted in the denial of entry of the Misseriya migration into Warrap State for the fifth consecutive year.

8. With the onset of the dry season, the number of Ngok Dinka displaced persons returning to their homes continued to increase and is currently estimated to be over 20,000 north of the Kiir/Bahr el-Arab River, including approximately 4,500 in Abyei town. No security incidents between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya have taken place during the reporting period. UNISFA increased its average number of daily patrols to 65, covering approximately 1,400 kilometres, and maintained a constant visible military presence along the migration routes.

9. The main road from Diffra to Abyei town, which is used for the transportation of goods, was repaired by UNISFA in November. As a result, commercial activity in Abyei town and market increased during the reporting period. The market, which was closed following the security incidents of 12 and 13 November, reopened on 20 November. UNISFA has maintained a platoon presence in and around the market.

10. The focus of the United Nations Mine Action Service in the current dry season is to clear additional roads to ensure the unrestricted movement of the local population, UNISFA patrols and humanitarian actors. Together with its contractor, and in view of the high number of anticipated returns of displaced Ngok Dinka, the United Nations Mine Action Service is undertaking area assessments, focusing on villages in the southern Abyei Area and in the vicinity of Abyei town.

III. Political developments

11. The Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan met in Addis Ababa from 12 to 14 December to discuss, among other issues, the establishment of the Abyei Area institutions. On 13 December, South Sudan accepted the Government of the Sudan's list of nominees for the positions of Deputy Chief Administrator and Speaker of the Abyei Area Council.

12. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union held its 349th meeting on 14 December, nine days after the expiry of its 5 December deadline for the Sudan and South Sudan to agree on the final status of the Abyei Area. The Peace and Security Council reiterated its earlier acceptance of the 21 September 2012 proposal of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel recommending that a referendum be held in October 2013 to determine the final status of the Abyei Area. While noting the submission by the Sudan of a list of nominees for the Abyei Area Administration and Council, it urged both parties to carry forward the process of establishing the Abyei Area institutions. Significantly, it referred the final decision on the determination of the final status of the Abyei Area to the Summit of the African Union Heads of State and Government, scheduled to begin in Addis Ababa on 25 January 2013. Subsequently, President Omer Al-Bashir and President Salva Kiir met in Addis Ababa on 4 and 5 January. Both Presidents, as reported by the Panel, called on the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee to meet and immediately establish the Abyei Area institutions.

13. The eighth meeting of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee was held in Addis Ababa on 12 and 13 January. The parties agreed upon the nomination of the members of the Abyei Area institutions, including the Chief and Deputy Chief Administrator and the five heads of department, and on the nomination of the Chair of the Abyei Area Council. However, the parties were unable to agree on the composition of the Abyei Area Council. The Co-Chairs of the Committee further noted that the agreed nominations would only become effective once the composition of the Abyei Area Council had been resolved. In a positive development, the Co-Chairs agreed to instruct their respective police experts to begin work on proposals for the size and composition of the future Abyei Police Service and to discuss a joint proposal at a meeting to be held in Abyei town on 30 January. The next meeting of the Committee is expected to be held in Abyei town on 15 February.

IV. Status of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism

14. The Sudan and South Sudan have made progress towards the implementation of their agreement to establish the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, as provided in the Agreement on Border Security and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism of 29 June 2011, the Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission of 30 July 2011 and the Agreement on Security Arrangements of 27 September 2012.

15. Following the inconclusive outcome of the meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism held in Juba in early November, the Sudan hosted a follow-up meeting on 9 and 10 December in Khartoum. Having reached an impasse on the way forward, the two Co-Chairs of the Joint Mechanism requested the African Union

High-level Implementation Panel to convene and chair an extraordinary session of the Mechanism and draw up an agenda in consultation with the parties.

16. The extraordinary meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism was held in Addis Ababa from 15 to 18 December. At the conclusion of the meeting, the two delegations agreed to the immediate establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and the Ad Hoc Committee, and to open 10 border crossing corridors. They further agreed that either of them may, at any time, submit security-related complaints to the Co-Chairs of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism for consideration by an appropriate subcommittee.

17. The Joint Political and Security Mechanism also established a technical committee, which, with the support of UNISFA, developed an implementation plan and timetable for the activation of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. The agreed implementation plan, which was endorsed by the Co-Chairs of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism on 19 December, has retained a two-phase deployment approach. During the first phase, a new initial operating capability would be established in two of the four sector headquarters on the border between the two countries. The second phase, with full operating capability, would entail the activation of all four sectors.

18. The parties also agreed on the timelines for the withdrawal of their forces from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and the operationalization of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. Finally, the implementation plan further noted that special arrangements for the "14-mile" area, as provided under the Agreement on Security Arrangements of 27 September, had yet to be agreed upon. During their summit meeting held in Addis Ababa on 4 and 5 January 2013, Presidents Bashir and Kiir directed the Joint Political and Security Mechanism to ensure that, at its next meeting, the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone would be created without further delay.

19. The Joint Political and Security Mechanism reconvened in a further extraordinary session held in Addis Ababa from 14 to 18 January. During the meeting, in accordance with the two-phase approach, the parties agreed that the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism initial operating capability would be established with temporary headquarters in Kadugli (Southern Kordofan, Sudan), sector headquarters in Kadugli and Gok Machar (Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan) and a total of four teams of monitors. They further agreed that full operating capability would be established with additional sector headquarters in Buram (South Darfur, the Sudan) and Malakal (Upper Nile State, South Sudan) and the deployment of all 10 teams of monitors. The envisaged number of UNISFA, Sudanese and South Sudanese monitors will remain at 90 each, and the parties will build up the total monitor strength, based on operationalization progress, starting with 70 monitors each. They also recommended that the UNISFA force protection should be increased to 860 troops, from the previously agreed 300. The parties failed to actually establish the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and create the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, however, due to remaining disagreements on the length of the 14-mile area and a dispute over the need to proceed concurrently with the implementation of their oil agreement. The Sudan insisted that the Agreement on Security Arrangements had to be implemented in full

before any other could proceed, while South Sudan maintained that the agreements of 27 September 2012 had to be implemented concurrently.

20. On 16 January 2013, the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan announced nevertheless that they had completed the withdrawal of their respective forces from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone centre line, in accordance with the 28-day deadline set on 19 December 2012, the date of the adoption of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism implementation plan by the Joint Political and Security Mechanism. The withdrawal of their forces has yet to be verified.

21. For the purpose of establishing necessary operational and strategic mechanisms, UNISFA, UNMISS and UNAMID held a joint meeting in Juba on 30 November. The three missions agreed to create working groups for that purpose, which are to hold discussions on a monthly basis. The requisite staff planning for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism to conduct patrols together with the mine action teams has been completed, while demining-related training plans, designed to train demining teams on investigation and verification tasks, are being finalized.

22. UNISFA also conducted a series of reconnaissance missions with UNMISS support to proposed Mechanism team sites in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal State and Southern Kordofan State for the purpose of identifying deployment locations, accommodation and office space for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism team sites, and sector headquarters.

V. Humanitarian situation

23. With the increasing migration momentum and flow of returnees into the area of operations, the focus of the effort by both the humanitarian community and UNISFA has been to ensure simultaneous humanitarian interventions covering both communities, in order to avoid any clashes over resources and assistance. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Development Programme have commenced a joint peacebuilding initiative, in order to facilitate dialogue between returning Ngok Dinka and migrating Misseriya communities.

24. Adequate water supply remains a key factor in preventing intercommunal conflict, especially during the migration season. UNISFA and the humanitarian community have been collaborating to identify scarcity areas and create additional water points within them. As part of the $3.8 million financial assistance package allocated by the United States Agency for International Development to support humanitarian assistance in respect of health and clean water for vulnerable populations in the Abyei Area, IOM is planning to construct 17 water yards during the current dry season, in areas north of Abyei town.

25. The World Health Organization recently vaccinated over 12,500 children under the age of 5 against poliomyelitis in addition to supplementing medical supplies for two hospitals in Abyei town. Among the relief and rehabilitation programmes targeting the Ngok Dinka population, the United Nations Children's Fund and IOM have continued to rehabilitate water points in the Abyei Area, while IOM and the Abyei Catholic Church have provided over 500 emergency shelter kits to displaced persons in and around Abyei town. The Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees has been distributing emergency non-food items to an average of 100 vulnerable displaced persons per month within the Abyei Area. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has vaccinated 16,000 livestock belonging to the Ngok Dinka as part of its livestock vaccination programme.

VI. Protection of civilians

26. No intercommunal incidents occurred in the Abyei Area during the reporting period. Despite the violent incidents of 12 and 13 November, the situation has remained calm in Abyei town since then and the Force has continued its efforts to fill the security vacuum resulting from the absence of the Abyei Area institutions and Abyei Police Service. These efforts have included strengthening the joint security committees, regular interactions and dialogue with the local communities and promoting intercommunal dialogue between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya. The Force also continued to focus on quick-impact projects to promote conflict prevention initiatives, including strengthening resource-based infrastructure, such as water points, basic social services, such as schools and primary health centres, as well as community facilities, including an abattoir and livestock market yard.

27. In accordance with its conflict prevention and mitigation strategy and through a process of mutual consultation, UNISFA prevailed upon the Misseriya nomads at the leadership and operational levels to avoid areas around Abyei town and other areas with a greater concentration of Ngok Dinka returnees, particularly in the vicinity of Noong, Leu, Marial Achak and Tajalei. So far, the strategy has been successful. UNISFA troops are also present around these villages populated by Ngok Dinka, in order to closely monitor the situation and prevent any clashes.

28. There were no new developments during the period under review in respect of the operationalization of human rights monitoring in the Abyei Area, as called for by the Security Council under paragraph 10 of resolution 1990 (2011) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2075 (2012). Despite the lack of proper records or follow-up investigations by the local authorities, UNISFA patrols have been receiving informal reports of an increase in sexual and gender-based violence in and around the Agok town area.

VII. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

29. As at 20 January 2013, the military component of UNISFA comprised 3,974 of its authorized troop strength of 4,200 present and working on the ground (see annex I). The remaining 226 elements are earmarked for deployment within the UNISFA air aviation unit, the ranks of military observers and staff officers, and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.

30. The UNISFA military component continued to be deployed in three sectors (see annex II) since, with the commencement of the migration season, the UNISFA troops have moved out of wet season garrison locations to seven temporary operating bases in Leu, Tajalei, Marial Achak, Athony, Um Khariet, Noong and Dungoup, in order to provide security along the migratory routes. Four additional

temporary operating bases, in Shegei, Dumboloya, Lopong and Alal, are also in the process of being deployed.

31. After the recent third rotation of 969 Ethiopian troops between 17 and 28 December, battalion 6 replaced battalion 3 in Sector South. In line with its stated commitment to establish the Abyei Police Service, the Government of the Sudan recently issued visas for 11 members of the advance police team.

VIII. Mission support

32. With the onset of the dry season, the Force has undertaken the repair and rehabilitation of a number of arterial roads, including portions of the Abyei town-Diffra road and the Agok-Abyei town road, as well as several feeder roads. This has enabled access to all company operating bases and temporary operating bases. Preparations for the rehabilitation of the Athony airstrip near Agok have also begun.

33. Approximately, 50 per cent of UNISFA troops continue to live in tents provided by the United Nations. However, construction on the prefabricated buildings at the Force's interim headquarters and accommodations for troops within the Force's headquarters camp are in progress.

34. Despite the Government of South Sudan having lifted all restrictions on the movement of United Nations rations as at 23 November, the Force's contractor continues to face difficulties at the border in receiving clearance for troop rations. Efforts are ongoing to further streamline the import of food rations. Fuel stocks that decreased during the rainy season, during which no road supply was possible, are currently being replenished.

IX. Observations and recommendations

35. Despite the overall calm in the Abyei Area during the reporting period, the violent incidents in November have shown that some members within both the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya communities seem determined to ignite hostilities. In preparation for the holding of a referendum to determine the final status of the Abyei Area, as called for by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, both community leaders have declared their intention to increase their respective settlements within the Area. This has led to a further deterioration of intercommunal relations and an increase in tension between them.

36. A peaceful and orderly migration is vital to decreasing tensions and preventing conflict in the Area, and I urge the communities and their leaders, as well as the State and national Governments of both countries to continue to uphold the relevant international conventions and the traditional migratory rights across their territories by supporting positive and constructive dialogue between the communities.

37. As highlighted in previous reports, the absence of law enforcement agencies in the Abyei Area and the resultant security vacuum continue to pose significant challenges for UNISFA, which does not currently have the resources to address them. The lack of concrete progress in the establishment of the Abyei Police Service is giving rise to informal law enforcement mechanisms and discouraging conflict resolution through peaceful means. Meanwhile, the number of returnees into the

Abyei Area is steadily increasing and there is an urgent need to provide them with basic services and infrastructure. Setting up the Abyei Area institutions, in accordance with the 20 June 2011 Agreement, including the Administration, the Council and the Police Service, should remain a priority for both Governments.

38. Given the simultaneous presence of the Ngok Dinka and nomadic Misseriya communities within the Abyei Area, as well as vigilante groups and informal administrative mechanisms, it is crucial to build up an enabling environment for sustainable peace and development through human rights monitoring and verification mechanisms. I strongly encourage the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to take adequate measures to enable UNISFA to fulfil its mandate.

39. I commend the parties on the compromise reached during the extraordinary meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism held in Addis Ababa from 14 to 18 January 2013, during which they made progress in defining the operational modalities necessary for the establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and activation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. I urge both parties to resolve their remaining differences over the 14-mile area and the implementation of the oil agreement and to urgently activate their agreed security mechanisms. I welcome the communication by both countries announcing the withdrawal of their respective troops from the centre line of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone.

40. I take note of the agreement of the parties that the force protection element provided by UNISFA to support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism should be increased from 300 to 860 troops. That agreement implies an increase of the UNISFA current troop ceiling and will have support and financial implications for the Force. Once the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone has been created and the Mechanism activated, I will send a letter to the Council with detailed recommendations on this issue, including the full support and financial implications. UNISFA is ready to immediately support the Mechanism's initial operating capability.

41. In conclusion, I would like to convey my deep gratitude to the Government of Ethiopia for its contribution to the cause of lasting peace in the region. In particular, I would like to thank the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Hailemariam Desalegn, for his personal efforts to assist both countries in resolving their outstanding differences. I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to my Special Envoy, Haile Menkerios, and to the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, led by President Thabo Mbeki, for their tireless endeavours to promote a peaceful coexistence between the Sudan and South Sudan.

42. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the UNISFA Head of Mission, Lieutenant-General Tadesse Werede Tesfay, for his leadership of the mission and unwavering commitment to the effective implementation of its mandate. As he steps down as Head of Mission, I thank him for his service to the United Nations and to the people of Abyei and wish him the best in his future endeavours. Last, I would like to thank the staff of UNISFA for their contribution to helping to restore normalcy to the Abyei Area, including by promoting reconciliation and peaceful coexistence among the various communities, often under very difficult conditions.

Annex I

Composition of the military component of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, including the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism

Country	*Description*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
Benin	Experts on mission	3		4
	Contingent troops	1		
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Experts on mission	3		4
	Contingent troops	1		
Brazil	Experts on mission	1		3
	Contingent troops	2		
Burundi	Experts on mission	1		1
Cambodia	Experts on mission	1		1
Ecuador	Experts on mission	1		1
El Salvador	Experts on mission	1		1
Ethiopia	Experts on mission	82	4	3 895
	Contingent troops	3 595	214	
Ghana	Experts on mission	3		5
	Contingent troops	2		
Guatemala	Experts on mission	2		3
	Contingent troops	1		
Guinea	Experts on mission	2		2
India	Experts on mission	2		4
	Contingent troops	2		
Indonesia	Experts on mission	1		2
	Contingent troops	1		
Kyrgyzstan	Experts on mission	1		1
Malaysia	Experts on mission	1		1
Mongolia	Experts on mission	2		2
Mozambique	Experts on mission	1		1
Namibia	Experts on mission	1		1
Nepal	Experts on mission	3		5
	Contingent troops	2		
Nigeria	Experts on mission	1		4
	Contingent troops	3		
Paraguay	Experts on mission	1		1

Country	*Description*	*Male*	*Female*	*Total*
Peru	Experts on mission	2		3
	Contingent troops	1		
Philippines	Experts on mission	1		2
	Contingent troops	1		
Russian Federation	Experts on mission	1		3
	Contingent troops	2		
Rwanda	Experts on mission	2		4
	Contingent troops	2		
Sierra Leone	Experts on mission	3		3
Sri Lanka	Experts on mission	5		6
	Contingent troops	1		
United Republic of Tanzania	Experts on mission	1		2
	Contingent troops		1	
Ukraine	Experts on mission	2		4
	Contingent troops	2		
Uruguay	Contingent troops	1		1
Zambia	Experts on mission	1		1
Zimbabwe	Experts on mission	2		3
	Contingent troops	1		
Total		**3 755**	**219**	**3 974**

Annex II

Map of the deployment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei


UNISFA
January 2013
SOUTHERN KORDOFAN
SOUTHERN DARFUR
SUDAN
SOUTH SUDAN
NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL
WARRAP
UNITY
Abyei
Sector NORTH
Sector CENTER
Sector SOUTH
ETHIOPIA
Battalion sector line
Undetermined international boundary
State boundary
Area of Operation
Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Map No. 4407 Rev. 12 UNITED NATIONS
January 2013 (Colour)
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2013/60

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 January 2013

Original: English

Note verbale dated 25 January 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the United Nations and has the honour to attach herewith the text of a letter from Ms. Karin Enström, Minister of Defence of Sweden, to the Secretary-General (see annex).

The Swedish Mission kindly requests that the present note verbale and the annex thereto be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

13-21902 (E) 280113

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Annex to the note verbale dated 25 January 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the Swedish Government today announced its decision to provide logistics support to the member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), consistent with the request of the Security Council in its resolution 2085 (2012).

On short notice, Sweden will make C17 flight-hours available for ECOWAS from the Strategic Airlift Capability, in order to speed up the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali.

Our support will be closely coordinated with the efforts undertaken by other parts of the international community.

(*Signed*) Karin **Enström**
Minister of Defence

United Nations S/2013/61

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 25 January 2013 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to my letter of 3 January, I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council have agreed to send a mission to Yemen which would visit Sana'a on 27 January 2013. Ambassadors Mark Lyall Grant of the United Kingdom and Mohammed Loulichki of Morocco will co-lead the mission. The members of the Council have agreed on the terms of reference of the mission (see annex).

Following consultations with the members, it has been agreed that the composition of the mission is as follows:

Mr. Mario Oyarzábal (Argentina)
Ambassador Gary Francis Quinlan (Australia)
Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan)
Ms. Hua Jiang (China)
Mr. Martin Briens (France)
Ambassador Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala)
Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg)
Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco)
Ambassador Raza Bashir Tarar (Pakistan)
Ambassador Shin Dong-ik (Republic of Korea)
Mr. Alexander A. Pankin (Russian Federation)
Mr. Olivier Nduhungirehe (Rwanda)
Ambassador Kodjo Menan (Togo)
Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom)

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Masood **Khan**
President of the Security Council

13-21890 (E) 280113

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Annex

Terms of reference for the Security Council mission to Yemen on 27 January 2013

Led by Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco)

1. To reaffirm the continued support of the Security Council for the ongoing political transition process in Yemen, in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council implementation mechanism and leading towards elections in February 2014, and for the important roles of President Hadi, the Government of National Unity, and the people of Yemen within that process.

2. To assess the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2051 (2012), and review the progress the Government of Yemen has made towards launching the National Dialogue Conference, restructuring the security and armed forces under a unified professional national leadership structure, ending all armed conflicts and addressing the economic as well as humanitarian situation.

3. To consider the security situation in Yemen, including the ongoing work of the Yemeni Government to combat Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and to carry out security sector reforms.

4. To meet, discuss and evaluate the transition with a cross section of Yemeni parties and international partners in Sana'a, including, if possible, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Yemeni actors, including civil society representatives.

5. To assess progress made towards activating pledges made in Riyadh on 4 September 2012 and at the Friends of Yemen Ministerial Meeting in New York on 27 September 2012.

6. To reiterate the importance of immediate donor coordination and funding in order to alleviate the critical humanitarian situation in Yemen.

7. To recognize the many challenges still facing Yemen in the transition process and highlight the Security Council's continued concern about those hindering or interfering in the transition, noting that resolution 2051 (2012) allows for the imposition of sanctions on spoilers.

8. To express strong support for the role of the international community in implementing the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, including the five permanent members of the Security Council, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the representative of the European Union, and the Secretary-General's Special Adviser and his Good Offices in Yemen.

United Nations S/2013/62

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 January 2013
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 28 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, I should like to draw your attention to the following information:

The speech on the crisis in Syria delivered by President Bashar Al-Assad on 6 January 2013 provides ample scope for a political solution. The speech is grounded in the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, international law, the relevant United Nations resolutions and the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012. It sets out a realistic basis for a solution to the events in Syria and reflects the fundamental elements that should underlie any such solution.

The President of the Syrian Arab Republic has requested the Syrian Government to put in place mechanisms and measures to implement the political programme to resolve the crisis. A ministerial working group chaired by the Prime Minister has been formed. It is comprised of eight ministers whose purviews include national dialogue and reconciliation and humanitarian issues. The Prime Minister has requested the competent Government authorities to meet intensively in order to expedite emergency measures to mitigate the impact of the events, particularly the damage caused by terrorist sabotage of facilities, and to reconstruct the energy and water infrastructure, provide consumer goods, control the economic situation, adopt decisions to assist and compensate those affected by the crisis, and address the plight of displaced persons in the country and abroad.

The political programme states that an end to violence is a priority for genuine action towards national dialogue, reconciliation and reconstruction. It stresses that all States and regional and international actors should undertake to cease or refrain from arming, funding or harbouring armed groups; that all armed groups should immediately cease violence; and that the Army and Armed Forces should undertake to end military operations. The programme also provides that the access of humanitarian aid to those who need it should be facilitated; that work to restore the infrastructure should begin; that compensation should be paid to those affected; that Syrian citizens who left because of the events should receive the necessary guarantees; that their return through border crossings should be facilitated; and that all Syrian opposition forces should receive guarantees in order to enter the country, remain there and depart without hindrance with a view to participating in the national dialogue.

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In implementation of the political programme, and after the ministerial working group had considered the necessary guarantees for Syrian citizens who left because of the events, the Ministry of the Interior issued a call on 24 January 2012 for all Syrian citizens who left the national territory because of the events to return to Syria, irrespective of whether they left lawfully or unlawfully and of any proceedings in place against them. It stated that the competent authorities would do everything necessary to facilitate the process and address the status of undocumented persons at border centres.

The Ministry of the Interior has issued instructions stating that all Syrian opposition forces outside Syrian territory that wish to participate in national dialogue may enter the country, irrespective of the documents in their possession. It has committed to taking every measure to facilitate the process and address their situation through the border centres.

Acting on a decision of the ministerial working group, the Ministry of Justice has taken measures to expedite the processing of cases involving the current events and to release anyone who has not been convicted. The Ministry will put in place mechanisms to regularize the situation of any individuals who lay down their weapons and hand them over to the competent authorities. Such individuals will not be prosecuted in that connection. On 27 January 2013, the Higher Council of the Judiciary issued decision No. 15 suspending any judicial proceedings against any opposition political forces and personalities participating in the national dialogue.

As regards humanitarian issues, the Higher Relief Commission has been requested to provide humanitarian assistance and facilitate its access to those who need it, in cooperation with civil society initiatives, the institutions of the international community and the relevant international organizations within and beyond Syria. The Commission adopted decisions to strengthen the role of the Syrian Red Crescent and the International Committee of the Red Cross in providing essential assistance to affected families that settled outside the country, and to work with those families in order to bring them back to their home country with provisions for all of their fundamental needs.

The Syrian State is now in a position to work towards realizing the political programme on the ground. In the next few days, we shall inform the Security Council of other measures that will be taken. Syria trusts that the international community and the United Nations will help to ensure that the political programme and the Government's efforts to implement it are understood, and that they will assist in its implementation without preconditions for the sake of the stability of Syria and the preservation of international peace and security in the Middle East and the world.

I should be grateful if this letter could be issued as an official document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/67/715–S/2013/63

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
29 January 2013

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 31
Report of the Peacebuilding Commission

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its sixth session

I. Introduction

1. The present report has been prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005), in which the Peacebuilding Commission was requested to submit an annual report to the Assembly for an annual debate and review. Pursuant to Council resolution 1646 (2005), the report will also be submitted to the Council for an annual debate. The present report covers the sixth session of the Commission, held from 1 January to 31 December 2012.

2. On 29 October 2010, the General Assembly and the Security Council adopted resolutions 65/7 and 1947 (2010) respectively, through which the two organs, inter alia, requested the Commission to reflect in its annual reports the progress made in taking forward the relevant recommendations contained in the report presented in 2010 by the co-facilitators on the review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture (A/64/868-S/2010/393, annex).

3. The present report uses a new format for reporting on progress in taking forward the recommendations of the 2010 review, organized around the main functions and work of the Peacebuilding Commission and placing particular emphasis on the results achieved and the challenges and opportunities related to the impact of the Commission in the field and its relations at United Nations Headquarters. In doing so, the report draws on relevant country-specific examples to reinforce the analysis. A list of activities undertaken by the various configurations will be made available in a separate document which will be posted on the website of the Commission (www.un.org/en/peacebuilding)

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II. Work of the Peacebuilding Commission

A. Overview of main issues and challenges

4. The reporting period witnessed developments in countries on the agenda that highlighted the potential but also the limitations of the Commission. The Commission provided support for the launching of a national reconciliation strategy in Liberia, the successful conduct of elections in Sierra Leone and resource mobilization in support of a new poverty reduction strategy in Burundi. In doing so, the Commission reaffirmed the centrality of strong national ownership at the core of peacebuilding. The support provided by the Commission to these processes would have not been sufficiently effective if national actors in the respective countries had not demonstrated sufficient leadership and commitment. Conversely, the disruption of the presidential electoral process through an unconstitutional change of government in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April undermined the progress in peacebuilding that had begun to take place in that country. This development underlined the fact that the role of the Commission in political accompaniment is limited in the absence of broader, more vigorous and continuing national commitment and efforts to address the root causes of instability.

5. Meanwhile, in pursuance of the road map for actions in 2012, which is designed to take forward relevant recommendations from the 2010 review, the work undertaken by the Commission on policy development has prioritized resource mobilization and partnerships as an area where the Commission is expected to prove its added value at the country level. Thus the work of the Commission has focused on supporting national aid coordination and resource mobilization efforts, as well as strengthening the partnership with the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

6. During the reporting period, the Commission sought to deepen its working relationship with key United Nations actors in the field, especially the senior leadership. Supported by the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Department of Political Affairs, a meeting of members of the Chairs Group and the senior United Nations leadership in the countries on the agenda of the Commission was held in May to discuss the mutual expectations of the two sides and to explore areas of complementarity in their work. This work is closely linked yet runs parallel to efforts aimed at fostering deeper relations with the Security Council and articulating more widely the value added by the Commission in specific country situations. Each of these relationships deserves the continuing attention of the Commission as it seeks to add value to the work of United Nations field-based actors in supporting peacebuilding processes. Further focus on the practical elements of the partnerships with the international financial institutions, the private sector, foundations and regional, subregional and non-governmental organizations will help to support the efforts of the Commission to strengthen its linkages with operational and field-based actors and will reinforce its role in fostering coherence among them.

7. The role of the Commission in support of national capacity development has been the subject of interaction between the Organizational Committee and the Chair of the Steering Committee on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict during the reporting period. Members expect the Commission to offer a platform that fosters direct exchange of experiences between countries on the agenda and other countries that have undergone a successful transition from conflict to development.

Building on the high-level meeting in 2011 on the topic "Post-conflict peacebuilding: the experience of Rwanda", the Commission can serve as a forum to draw on the national experiences of its membership in support of a demand-driven approach to capacity development for peacebuilding in the countries on its agenda, with particular attention to facilitating South-South and triangular cooperation.

8. In this regard, the full potential of the unique membership structure of the Commission and its nature as a political platform made up of the most influential global actors is yet to be realized. The 2010 review noted that the lack of strong political support from capitals was one reason for a less effective impact of the Commission in the field. To this end, the high-level event in September 2012 on the topic "Peacebuilding: the way towards sustainable peace and security", organized at the initiative of the current Chair (Bangladesh), aimed to engage member States at the highest policymaking level from capitals. Chaired by the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, the event was attended by heads of State and Government, ministers, heads of delegations and representatives of private sectors and civil society. The Secretary-General also addressed the event. Through the consensus declaration adopted at the event, the Commission has been able to draw attention to and reaffirm the commitment of its broader membership to the key principles, objectives and priorities which it has consistently promoted, at both the policy and country-specific levels. In this regard, the declaration highlighted the centrality of sustainable peace and security through a coherent and coordinated response, the need to ensure national ownership, inclusive national processes, gender mainstreaming, youth employment and job creation, the marshalling of adequate resources for peacebuilding and the sharing of experiences and lessons learned, in particular through South-South and triangular cooperation. However, the Commission recognizes the need for a systematic follow-up of the event by demonstrating the relevance of the Commission to capital-based officials and so increasing their engagement.

9. The Commission attaches particular importance to developing its relations with the principal organs of the United Nations. Strengthening relations with the Security Council was given high priority during the reporting period in view of the fact that five of the six countries on the agenda of the Commission have been referred through the Council. The consideration by the Council in July of the report of the Commission on its fifth session offered an opportunity to delve deeper into the proposition made in the 2010 review that the potential exists to create a new dynamic between a more forthcoming Security Council and a better performing Commission. A key entry point for building the relationship is for the Council to clearly articulate its expectations to the Commission and ensuring that the Commission can live up to these expectations and demonstrate added value. These issues were extensively deliberated upon during the debate of the Council on the report of the Commission and during the informal interactive dialogue, of 12 and 13 July respectively, and were further explored in the meeting of the Working Group on Lessons Learned on 21 November. There are encouraging signs that the Council has given practical effect to these issues. For example, the Council requested the Chairs of the country configurations on Liberia and Sierra Leone to brief the Council in the context of the mandate renewal of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) in September. In response, the Commission provided an analytical perspective on and outlined the specific areas around which its support to

Liberia and Sierra Leone is being structured. Such clarity should help the Council in assessing progress towards meeting critical peacebuilding-related targets in both countries ahead of its consideration of the nature and pace of the transition of UNMIL and UNIPSIL respectively. Earlier, the Burundi configuration sought to put its advisory role into effect in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council reporting on the results of a visit to Burundi by its Chair in April (see A/66/801-S/2012/320).

B. Resource mobilization, partnerships and advocacy

Resource mobilization

10. The Commission has continued to intensify its efforts to fulfil its function relating to mobilization of resources. In response to an increasing demand for the identification of practical approaches to this function commensurate with the nature of the Commission as an intergovernmental body, the Peacebuilding Support Office submitted a paper in July presenting a list of options and opportunities for the Commission to perform this crucial function. The policy discussions led by the Organizational Committee in July and October explored ways to redefine the role of the Commission and manage the expectations of the countries on its agenda and other actors. One outgrowth of the discussion was a general acknowledgement of the need to map resource flows as a tool which could help in identifying gaps and stimulating the development of effective national aid management and coordination systems. Other areas identified included the support of the Commission for the organization of donor conferences and engagement with other donors, such as foundations and philanthropic organizations.

11. In response to the acknowledgement of the need to identify gaps, drawing on the outcome of the first periodic review of the statement of mutual commitments for peacebuilding in Guinea the Working Group on Lessons Learned (Japan) and the Guinea configuration (Luxembourg), together with the authorities of Guinea, have conducted a mapping exercise with a view to identifying relevant actors and programmes, as well as overlaps and gaps in funding and capacities. The exercise was also aimed at supporting the establishment of an aid information and management system which would allow the Government of Guinea to have greater predictability of international support to peacebuilding and, if applicable, the wider development framework. As an initial result of this exercise, the information on countries and institutions that are funding key peacebuilding priorities in Guinea has been updated. However, the Working Group noted the difficulty of securing reliable and up-to-date information and encouraged the Commission to advocate with donors for accurate and frequent reporting of aid flows and to assist the country in devising a resource mobilization strategy, which would allow the Government to assess and prioritize its national resource mobilization efforts. Going forward, further analysis of the financing gaps and of the opportunities to reinforce coordination mechanisms in Guinea should be the focus of a follow-up phase to this pilot mapping exercise. This will also help to better programme the next phase of projects supported by the Peacebuilding Fund, ensuring coherence with projects funded by other partners. The Guinea configuration should also continue exploring the integration of peacebuilding and development objectives, following a similar approach to the one taken by the Burundi, Central African Republic and Sierra Leone configurations, notably in view of the preparation of the next poverty reduction strategy framework

in the country. Such integration would help to strengthen national ownership, as well as the alignment of the support from partners behind national priorities for peacebuilding and development.

12. At the Burundi partners conference, which took place in Geneva on 29 and 30 October, partners pledged more than $2.5 billion to support the new poverty reduction strategy for Burundi for the period 2013-2016. Such an expression of commitment went beyond the expectation of the Government of Burundi of mobilizing $1 billion. In addition, the Geneva conference witnessed the expansion of the donor base for Burundi. New and emerging partners, including Member States, foundations and development funds, have joined traditional donors in expressing support for Burundi. This development, in particular, was the result of intensive advocacy work undertaken by the Chair of the configuration (Switzerland) during the six to nine months that preceded the conference. The Burundi partners conference not only resulted in resource mobilization and the expansion of the donor base, it also offered an opportunity for policy dialogue between Burundi and its partners which shed light on outstanding peacebuilding issues in the country and helped to renew the engagement of key partners around these issues. The outcome of the Geneva conference testifies to the importance of the countries concerned demonstrating the seriousness and ownership of ongoing and long-term peacebuilding efforts.

13. By contrast, the advances made in Guinea-Bissau in 2011 with donors willing to contribute to strengthening national institutions responsible for combating drug trafficking and to establishing a military pension fund were swiftly suspended in the aftermath of the unconstitutional change of government which took place in April 2012. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and several other bilateral and multilateral partners, including the Peacebuilding Fund, have indefinitely suspended their activities in the country as a result.

14. While ownership is a critical success factor for resource mobilization, the Commission has also realized that coordination of efforts and messages from and to the Governments concerned are crucial. In the case of the Central African Republic, and at the partners round table co-organized and hosted by the Commission and the Government of Belgium in June 2011, partners expressed the need for a follow-up meeting in 2012. However, efforts towards holding such a meeting were not entirely coordinated with the Commission and other key partners, and while these efforts led to an important thematic discussion by the Friends of the Central African Republic on the needs of the country, including financial needs, in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in April 2012, it did not result in the kind of financial support the country was expecting. The key national and international partners had a common analysis of the situation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, including security sector reform, but had different opinions regarding the appropriate timing and context of the meeting, resulting in contradictory opinions on the likelihood of success of a partners meeting aimed at mobilizing resources for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In contrast, a more timely and coordinated approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the country, when positive developments at the country level had been successfully communicated to key partners, allowed for mobilizing additional funds for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, including from the Peacebuilding Fund.

15. The lessons learned from the experience of the Commission in support of the Central African Republic and Burundi in organizing donor and partner conferences and in advocating with donors to fund national peace consolidation and development strategies may prove useful if the Commission is requested to remain engaged in and to help mobilize funding for the next poverty reduction strategy for Sierra Leone in 2013. The scope of the role of the Commission in resource mobilization in the case of Sierra Leone, however, could expand further. Subsequent to the November 2012 elections in Sierra Leone, the Security Council requested the Commission to continue to provide support to the country in this area, as well as in the coordination of international development efforts.

16. In Liberia, a resource mobilization strategy has been evolving during the second half of 2012. The main objective of the draft strategy is to maximize the potential of the Commission to mobilize resources for some agreed peacebuilding priorities and to support the Government of Liberia in its own efforts to mobilize resources. The strategy is based on supporting the efforts within existing Liberian coordination mechanisms such as the annual workplan for the justice and security programme and the justice and security trust fund, and coordinated efforts to support the implementation of the national reconciliation road map. Through the strategy, the Commission intends to build on the investment of the Peacebuilding Fund, while drawing in additional donors and encouraging partners to step up their efforts.

Partnerships

17. Promoting partnerships in support of peacebuilding is one of the priorities of the Commission. In this effort, the Commission has accorded special emphasis to building partnerships with international financial institutions, in particular the World Bank and AfDB, and with other actors such as private corporations, foundations and philanthropic organizations.

18. The partnership with the World Bank and AfDB was conceived on the basis of complementarity between the roles of the international financial institutions and the Commission in support of national strategies and priorities at the country level, and around key peacebuilding-related themes.

19. With a view to deepening the partnership between the Commission and the World Bank, the Chairs Group visited Washington, D.C., on 13 September to hold a dialogue with the senior officials and executive directors of the World Bank, during which it was emphasized that a potential area of complementarity could manifest itself in the process of developing poverty reduction strategies in countries on the agenda of the Commission. In the strategies that have been developed in the Central African Republic and Burundi in 2011 and 2012 respectively, critical peacebuilding priorities were highlighted with a view to ensuring sustained focus and commitment from the Governments concerned and their international partners. In this connection, the dialogue has underlined the importance of engagement by the World Bank in the country-level consultations leading to the design of the Peacebuilding Commission instruments of engagement. Such engagement will help in aligning these instruments with the country assistance strategies of the World Bank. It was also emphasized that programmes designed to foster an enabling political environment, for example, in areas such as political dialogue and reconciliation represent possible entry points for the Commission and can be complementary to the engagement of

the World Bank in countries on the agenda. Going forward, therefore, there is a clear need for sustaining a dialogue with the World Bank executive directors and senior management at the policy level, which could be significant as the Commission seeks to develop the conceptual framework for the partnership. In addition and drawing on country-specific experience, the World Bank, the United Nations in-country presence and the Commission could identify specific examples of collaboration that could be further scaled up and broadened.

20. As a follow-up to the visit of the Chairs Group in 2011, the partnership with AfDB is proceeding, also on the basis of identifying areas of complementarity at the country level. Through the Peacebuilding Support Office, the process of developing the AfDB country strategy paper for the Central African Republic in support of the new country poverty reduction strategy is being closely coordinated with the Commission, in particular through an analysis of the key peacebuilding priorities, challenges and opportunities for peace dividends in the country. It has been further agreed that the Commission and AfDB need to identify pilot countries on the agenda where the two institutions could undertake joint initiatives in the area of job creation in collaboration with other United Nations implementing agencies. A joint field mission to Guinea to explore ways for the Global Facility on Employment Creation in Fragile Situations to assist with generation of employment for young people is being explored for 2013. Such a joint mission would be linked with the study which the Government of Guinea and the United Nations have initiated on opportunities for employment for young people and women. In Liberia, AfDB and the Commission have agreed to collaborate in the process of the development of the upcoming AfDB country strategy paper for the period 2013-2017 and the second review of the statement of mutual commitments for 2013, with a view to ensuring complementarity of their respective roles in support of peacebuilding in Liberia. AfDB has also expressed an interest in collaborating with the Commission and the United Nations country team in Guinea in supporting national capacity development in the area of management of natural resources. The Commission also needs to further explore areas that could benefit from complementarity of funding between the Peacebuilding Fund and the AfDB Fragile States Facility, building on the lessons learned from initial Peacebuilding Fund investments in countries on the agenda and with a view to scaling up or replicating existing projects. Within the framework of agreed national priorities, the investments of AfDB could, where feasible, be designed to draw on or support the projects financed from the Peacebuilding Fund in order to ensure their complementarity and sustainability, an area to which the Commission could lend its support.

21. The efforts exerted by the Commission to engage and partner with foundations, philanthropic organizations and the private sector have to date been ad hoc and have thus not resulted in much success. The Commission recognizes that other actors need to be approached as potential partners whose investments could be channelled in such a way as to contribute to broader peacebuilding objectives in the countries concerned. During the reporting period, the Working Group on Lessons Learned initiated the discussion by exploring the characteristics and comparative advantage of philanthropic and non-governmental organizations and private corporations in support of peacebuilding-related activities and objectives. While the role of the Commission to advocate for the countries on its agenda remains the same, the way in which the Commission approaches different actors will vary from foundations to private companies. The Commission should also be prepared to

identify areas where it can offer concrete support to partnerships between the countries on the agenda and other actors. The Working Group concluded that the Commission could take the first step by identifying a few influential foundations and private companies in the areas of recurring priorities in the countries on the agenda and engage at the highest level of decision-making. A collective and strategic outreach and the advocacy efforts of the membership will be crucial in attracting the attention of these other actors.

C. Political accompaniment

22. It is increasingly noted that the Commission was designed for and is well placed to provide sustained attention and political accompaniment for countries on its agenda, beyond the span of attention of other actors. The 2010 review affirmed that countries on the agenda have experienced, to varying degrees, an increment of international attention as a result of engagement with the Commission, and that this is especially important for countries that can fairly be considered as not receiving the attention they need from the international community. The intergovernmental and representative nature of the Commission confers a degree of legitimacy on its political engagement at the country level. Political accompaniment, however, is derived from the ability of the Commission to engage in a constructive dialogue on commonly agreed peacebuilding priorities with national counterparts in the countries concerned. Therefore, political accompaniment is mainstreamed into the various functions undertaken by the Commission, from resource mobilization to advocacy, and from building partnerships to building coherence. Yet, the Commission has usually approached its crucial role in this area against the backdrop of a parallel role played by the most senior United Nations representative in the countries concerned where a peacekeeping or special political mission exists. The differentiation in nature and scope, as well as the potential areas of synergy and complementarity, between these parallel roles needs to be further clarified.

23. In Liberia, for example, the political accompaniment function of the Commission is undertaken in support of the plan of the Government to assume key responsibilities currently shouldered by UNMIL by the time of the withdrawal of the mission. In addition to support in the required hubs for access to security and justice services, the Commission is engaged in the priority area of national reconciliation and its related aspects of decentralization, electoral and constitutional reforms and the role of women as agents of change in Liberian society. The Commission is in the process of conceiving the type of support it can offer to the Government of Liberia in the priority area of national reconciliation, including through encouraging a consultative and inclusive process in terms of the engagement of key national institutions and the various regions within the country. Partnership with UNMIL and other operational actors at the country level will be crucial in ensuring that key messages and programmes are sufficiently coordinated and targeted. In Guinea, the Commission has helped the interim commission set up by President Condé to prepare recommendations for a national reconciliation process to mobilize the requisite expertise and financial resources, confirming the importance of the accompaniment function at the start-up and throughout a crucial political process.

24. In support of the electoral process in Sierra Leone, the Commission has seized opportunities presented by field visits and meetings in New York to convey the expectations of the international community for free, fair and peaceful elections to

all national stakeholders. In particular, the Commission urged political parties to maintain open dialogue, including with the independent institutions mandated to prepare the elections, with a view to bridging disagreements ahead of the elections. The Commission has also drawn on its convening power to seek support for these key messages and to encourage financing from the Peacebuilding Fund for projects implemented by UNIPSIL and aimed at building the capacity of non-state actors to undertake civic and electoral education and engage in conflict prevention initiatives. This process has culminated in the signing in May by all relevant actors of a declaration which outlines clear principles for political competition and encourages the political parties, the media and others to fully respect those principles.

25. While the political accompaniment by the Commission for the electoral process in Sierra Leone has benefited from an advanced degree of convergence among key international partners for the country, the divergence of views within the international community in response to the April coup d'état that disrupted the electoral process in Guinea-Bissau has rendered the task of the Commission in this regard considerably more challenging. The situation in Guinea-Bissau has also invited the question of how the Commission would assess the readiness of a country to be placed on the agenda of the Commission and also of when a country should remain on the agenda in situations of an unconstitutional change of Government that is disruptive of peacebuilding.

26. Political accompaniment could be further manifested in the extent to which critical peacebuilding priorities continue to be at the centre of attention in the country concerned. In Burundi, the annual review of the instrument of engagement continued to offer relevant stakeholders in Bujumbura a platform to address peacebuilding-related issues at the ministerial and ambassadorial level. In contrast, the case of the Central African Republic poses the question of the feasibility of an engagement in cases when it is difficult for the Government to secure a successor for a resigning chair of the country configuration and an outgoing national focal point. The interruption of the dialogue between the Commission and a country on its agenda, in particular when such interruption extends over a period of time, has an adverse effect on the ability of the Commission to assume its advisory role and to monitor progress or setbacks in the peacebuilding process.

27. The support to the planning process for the new poverty reduction strategy in Burundi presents another dimension of political accompaniment in the engagement of the Commission in the country. In addition, the support rendered to Burundi in the areas of socioeconomic reintegration of former combatants and other groups affected by the conflict, land issues, revenue collection and the fight against corruption are other examples of peacebuilding-related issues with a socioeconomic dimension. On some of these issues, the support provided by the Commission has been in the area of raising awareness of partners, encouraging national policy responses and highlighting visibility of good practices and achievements in areas such as revenue collection and lowering corruption.

D. Forging coherence

28. The 2010 review concluded that the international community still struggled to achieve the necessary degree of coherence in the field and the Commission must use its political weight to seek to align the various actors behind the nationally

identified peacebuilding strategies and priorities. In the various forums and debates since the review, there has also been convergence among Member States that forging coherence and improving the coordination of actors is a key function and expectation from the Commission, in particular in post-conflict countries where national coordination capacities are often minimal, ineffective or non-existing. For example, the Government of Guinea expects the Commission to address weak coordination, both among donors and within the Government of Guinea, noting that the priorities of both sides are yet to be aligned with the priorities in the statement of mutual commitments. The Commission, however, has yet to identify and develop the ideal mechanisms that will enable it to undertake this function and that are commensurate with its nature as an advisory, non-operational and New York-based body. Naturally, the effectiveness of the Commission in undertaking such a function hinges on the individual and collective efforts of its members and the willingness of partners, including the United Nations system, to coordinate their respective activities. The experience of the Commission to date has proven that, in certain situations, key partners in New York and in the field may, understandably, have different perspectives on how to respond to national needs and priorities. With this critical challenge in mind, the declaration adopted by the high-level event in September reaffirmed the commitment of members to strive for a sustained, coordinated and coherent response to peacebuilding needs through multilateral, regional and bilateral mechanisms that are aligned with nationally identified peacebuilding strategies and priorities.

29. During the reporting period, the Commission has placed due emphasis on improving coordination with the senior representatives of the United Nations in the countries on the agenda. Such emphasis responds to a key recommendation of the 2010 review. In this regard, the Chairs Group and a number of Special and Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General in countries on the agenda held an exploratory discussion in New York in May. The meeting recognized the need for the two sides to delineate and develop shared understandings of their respective comparative advantages, roles and responsibilities and of areas where the relations could be mutually reinforcing. This effort requires rigorous follow-up from the Commission in the months to come, including through proactive engagement with the Security Council and with the highest United Nations leadership.

30. The alignment of the instruments of engagement of the Commission with the activities of the United Nations in the field has proven helpful in facilitating a coherent approach to addressing identified priorities. For example, the contribution by UNMIL to the design and review of the statement of mutual commitments in Liberia has contributed to a relatively broader ownership of the activities of the Commission in the country. In Sierra Leone, the Commission has effectively supported the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and has helped to create the conditions for him to engage with the national Government and the United Nations family in one streamlined and integrated multi-year programme that is aligned with the national peace consolidation and development strategy. The Commission is expected to exercise its political leverage to ensure that the gains made in terms of United Nations integration and coherence can be sustained.

31. Another feature of the role of the Commission in fostering coherence is drawing on its efforts in building partnerships with the international financial institutions and AfDB. The alignment of the engagement by these partners around national strategies and priorities is an area where such partnerships could

demonstrate real added value for the countries on the agenda. In Burundi, the finalization of the second poverty reduction strategy in 2012 and the preparation of the Burundi partners conference in Geneva in October offered an opportunity for the Commission to encourage coordinated and consistent messages. The joint press release, issued in New York on 16 November following the Geneva conference by the main partners, namely the World Bank, AfDB, the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme, is an example of the efforts of the Commission to promote coherence of the respective cooperation programmes of these partners with the country.

32. The support of the Commission for improving coherence at the country level has also benefited from increased synergy between its instruments of engagement and the activities of the Peacebuilding Fund at the country level. In Liberia, the Joint Steering Committee in Monrovia, which has traditionally been responsible for reviewing the activities funded by the Fund, is considered as the counterpart of the Commission at the country level, thus encouraging key partners to focus on peacebuilding priorities, while positioning the contribution of the Fund within the broader peacebuilding funding efforts. The Peacebuilding Fund Joint Steering Committee in Guinea has coordinated the input of the Government of Guinea and the United Nations country team to the first review of the statement of mutual commitments, thus linking the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund in the country. The Commission should consider ways to build on the successes of such initiatives and further empower them so as to lead to transparent mechanisms that strengthen coherence and national ownership.

E. Working methods

33. The 2010 review recalled the sense of the founding resolutions that the Peacebuilding Commission would be different from other United Nations bodies, namely, more flexible and innovative in its working methods, especially with a view to facilitating the contributions of a wide range of actors. Additionally, the review emphasized the need for a "whole of Peacebuilding Commission" view on a range of policy issues requiring collective consideration. At the same time, and in connection with the need to enhance the impact of the Commission in the field, the review also emphasized the need for the Commission to develop practical mechanisms which could help to feed and validate the work of the country configurations in New York. The reporting period has witnessed continued efforts to address these recommendations.

34. The Organizational Committee has streamlined its agenda to ensure a "whole of Peacebuilding Commission" approach to the implementation of the road map of actions in 2012. Meetings at the working level have been reintroduced with a view to deepening the engagement of member States and to allow for in-depth and detailed consideration of issues ahead of the formal meetings of the Committee. The Committee has shown the determination to remain the custodian of both the core mandates and the working methods of the Commission. In this regard, the Committee has initiated discussions on the first set of working methods related to options for the engagement of the Commission in countries on the agenda and the terms of reference for the work of country configurations and their Chairs at the country level. This work will help to clarify a number of important dimensions in which the Commission has developed experience and generated lessons learned. In

addition, generating and sustaining the interest and attention of national capitals and their engagement with the Commission represented a key challenge that the Committee has addressed on several occasions. In addition to the successful high-level event in September, the Committee is considering a suggestion to convene an annual session through which capital-based senior officials could engage in setting the policies and priorities of the Commission.

35. For country configurations, reducing the frequency of meetings at Headquarters while deepening the discussions on critical country-specific issues has been a key result in configurations which have either introduced an informal steering group or which have primarily conducted their work at the working level. Informal steering groups and working-level discussions help to deepen the engagement of member States and allow for in-depth and detailed consideration of issues ahead of meetings of whole configurations and principal level meetings.

36. The majority of the work of the Liberia configuration has been pursued through an informal steering group, with a membership that was willing and prepared to assume specific tasks and responsibilities. The meetings of the informal steering group have benefited from regular communications with actors in the field and by allowing members to exchange views and engage in informal analysis of the topics under consideration. The transaction costs of the Burundi configuration have been kept minimal with only one formal meeting of the configuration and most of the work being undertaken through an informal steering group, which has been effective in following up on issues, keeping members engaged at the ambassadorial level and having much more intense discussions with the Government of Burundi on sensitive issues. The approach of the Sierra Leone configuration has been similar and has reserved principal-level meetings for taking formal decisions or addressing particularly important issues. The work of the configuration has been conducted in close partnership between the Chair (Canada) and the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone. The Chair has also engaged bilaterally with a number of Member States on issues for which it was particularly well positioned. Otherwise, most of the work of the configuration has been conducted at the working level, which has also allowed for more frequent interactions with United Nations officials based in Freetown, including through videoconferences and regular encounters during visits to New York.

37. The former Chair of the Central African Republic configuration had convened weekly meetings of a small number of key United Nations actors in the three priority areas for peacebuilding in the country. While these meetings have been suspended since the resignation of the Chair of the configuration, the informal meetings were useful in maintaining the attention of the United Nations system on the Central African Republic, beyond the less frequent meetings of the Commission. The informal and more compact nature of this mechanism, complementing the full configuration meetings, enabled more targeted discussions resulting in more specific and concrete steps on the way forward.

38. The Guinea-Bissau configuration has also introduced an innovative approach through which it has drawn on the inputs from an independent panel of experts who had met ahead of a meeting of the configuration to address the situation in the country.

39. The Working Group on Lessons Learned has placed less emphasis on meetings and discussions at Headquarters and has prioritized a well-designed and extensively

researched preparatory process supported by field actors. In this regard, the Working Group has increasingly reached out to practitioners, as well as relevant United Nations operational entities, with a view to drawing on existing and evolving thinking on the topics under consideration. Through such an approach to its working methods, the Working Group has gradually enhanced its relevance for the work of the Commission at the country level. It is also considering ways in which to link the work undertaken by the Working Group to the field, including by holding a joint thematic workshop, together with the Chair of the country concerned, on the margin of field visits by the configuration or its Chair.

40. Going forward, the Commission will benefit from deeper and more active engagement from the representatives of the countries on the agenda. While some have been actively engaged and have contributed to the deliberations of the membership in country configurations, their engagement in broader policy discussions has not been consistent. The Commission needs to identify the means to facilitate the contribution of the countries on the agenda to discussions on mandates, partnerships and working methods.

F. Peacebuilding thematic issues

Economic revitalization: job creation

41. Employment of young people has been identified as a recurring peacebuilding priority for countries on the agenda of the Commission. The question of job creation has recently gained additional global attention and focus and there is increasing awareness that more coherent efforts by national and international actors are required. In this regard, the Commission needs to identify its niche in support of these efforts, whether by encouraging targeted short-term employment programmes or by promoting efforts aimed at boosting private sector growth and investment.

42. In countries on the agenda where a youth employment strategy is in place, the Commission is expected to mobilize broader international support for the implementation of the strategy through its advocacy function with major institutional partners and private investors. In Guinea, for example, the Commission has urged its members to support a project, led by the World Bank in partnership with the Government, which is aimed at the creation of 24,000 temporary jobs. A preliminary study is being conducted by the United Nations in partnership with other relevant international actors (notably the World Bank, AfDB and the European Union), funded by the Peacebuilding Fund.

43. The Commission can also lend its support to a nascent Global Facility for Employment Creation in Fragile Situations[1] that aims to strengthen the coordination and strategic direction of job creation efforts at a national level, among local actors and their international partners. Preliminary efforts have been made to expand the piloting of the work of this Facility to the countries on the agenda.

[1] An initiative of the World Bank Group, the African Development Bank, the International Labour Organization, the Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations Development Programme and the Peacebuilding Support Office.

National reconciliation

44. National reconciliation is drawing increasing attention as a cornerstone of sustainable peacebuilding. Liberia and Guinea have identified national reconciliation as key peacebuilding priorities for which they have sought support from the Commission.

45. In Liberia, for example, the Commission has supported the Government to prepare, in consultation with civil society, a strategic road map for national healing, peacebuilding and reconciliation, which is now being used as the main reference framework on all issues relating to reconciliation. An inclusive process for the validation of the road map is under way and is receiving particular focus by the Commission. In Guinea, the Commission has combined short-term and longer-term actions in its approach. In the short term, the Commission has advocated for a consensus on issues relating to the organization of parliamentary elections and for a coordinated response to the violence of 28 September 2009. In the longer term, the Commission has advocated for support by the United Nations and the international community to the national consultations that will define the content and the process of national reconciliation. A project to support these consultations is currently being finalized for funding by the Peacebuilding Fund.

Transition of United Nations missions in countries on the agenda of the Commission

46. Transition of United Nations missions has been closely linked to the work of the Commission. In paragraph 16 of the founding resolutions of the Commission (General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005)), the Assembly and the Council underlined that "in post-conflict situations on the agenda of the Security Council with which it is actively seized, in particular when there is a United Nations-mandated peacekeeping mission on the ground or under way and given the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter, the main purpose of the Commission will be to provide advice to the Council at its request". In view of the envisaged drawdown of Security Council mandated missions in three countries on the agenda of the Commission, namely Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone, this will remain one of the central themes which the Commission will need to consider.

47. Decisions and timelines relating to the transition of missions are heavily influenced by conditions in the host country and by the views of host Governments. Consequently, such transitions are diverse and are specific to the individual context. An evolving United Nations policy on transition of missions and the lessons being learned in that regard, as well as initial consideration by the Commission through its Working Group on Lessons Learned, have confirmed five key principles which can be applied to all United Nations transitions:

(a) Transition planning must start early with national and international actors, must be aligned to national plans and must remain flexible throughout the transition process;

(b) Integration of the United Nations in the field is essential to help build national peacebuilding capacities and to prepare the reconfigured United Nations presence to support national actors in key peacebuilding objectives for the longer-term;

(c) National ownership is crucial for a successful transition process and national leaders must be involved in decision-making throughout, reflecting the needs of society;

(d) National capacity development is vital for the success of the mission and to ensure effective handover of peacebuilding tasks to national actors;

(e) Communication is critical to managing the expectations and anxieties of national stakeholders, United Nations staff and Member States.

48. Furthermore, continuing peacebuilding efforts throughout and beyond the lifespan of a United Nations mission requires sustained and aligned political and financial commitment by national and international actors. A major task to be undertaken jointly by the United Nations, the wider multilateral system and Member States is to ensure sustained support for national peacebuilding priorities. The Commission has the potential to be a key actor in this regard, in view of its mandate to help sustain the attention of the international community to long-term, post-conflict peacebuilding objectives.

49. During the reporting period, the Commission has been closely following the development of the first security and justice hub in Liberia, which is aimed at promoting decentralization of the security and justice functions needed to ensure a smooth transition of ownership from UNMIL to the Liberian authorities. In Burundi, the Commission has advocated for the inclusion of peacebuilding priorities in the second generation poverty reduction strategy, an essential step as the country envisages transition of the United Nations Office in Burundi to a United Nations resident coordinator presence. In Sierra Leone, the Commission supported the successful completion of the national elections on 17 November, which was considered a watershed for the transition process in the country. The added value of the Commission in the context of its advisory role to the Security Council has been explored by the Working Group and has been identified as follows:

(a) Promoting a more coherent understanding of short- and long-term peacebuilding objectives on the ground, thus ensuring sustainability of the engagement of the United Nations and other partners beyond the drawdown of the mission;

(b) Becoming a vehicle through which the views and perspectives of all relevant actors (national, international and the United Nations) are factored into Security Council decisions on transition and that these decisions are grounded in country-level realities;

(c) Advising the Security Council on national preparedness for assuming key functions performed by a mission with the support of development actors from within and outside the United Nations;

(d) Supporting the preparedness of the United Nations country team to respond to emerging challenges in post-mission scenarios by initiating an early analysis of critical national capacity gaps. This analysis could help to inform the design by the Council of the transition process and draw early attention to such gaps;

(e) Helping to mobilize partnerships, which could in turn help to address possible funding gaps following the drawdown and withdrawal of United Nations missions.

50. Going forward, the Commission will need to further deepen its partnership with development actors so as to provide advice to the Security Council in its deliberations on transition processes based on a longer-term perspective that captures lingering risks to peace consolidation.

III. Conclusions and agenda going forward

Role of the membership of the Peacebuilding Commission

51. The unique membership structure of the Commission should enable it to serve as a central platform for discussion, coordination and advice on peacebuilding within the United Nations system and beyond. In performing this role, the Commission faces the serious constraints of lacking a system-wide mandating authority and resources at its disposal. There is therefore an urgent need to renew the sense of collective responsibility and commitment from the individual members of the Commission, including from the countries on its agenda.

Actions

(a) The principles and objectives agreed in the declaration emanating from the high-level event on the topic "Peacebuilding: the way towards sustainable peace and security" should become a reference point for the positions of individual members of the Commission on peacebuilding-related policies at relevant United Nations and non-United Nations forums, as appropriate;

(b) Encourage Member States to voluntarily undertake specific tasks at the country-specific and policy levels of the work of the Commission, as identified by the Organizational Committee or the country configurations respectively.

Relations with principal organs of the United Nations

52. While the ability of the Commission to enhance its impact primarily depends on the level of commitment demonstrated by its individual members, the Commission must continue to demonstrate its niche and so build a reputation for adding value within the United Nations system. More precise guidance from the Security Council about the nature of advice required would also be of help.

Actions

(a) The Organizational Committee, in particular through its seven members from the Security Council category, to consider taking forward ideas expressed at the Security Council debate and informal interactive dialogue of 12 and 13 July, as well as the meeting of the Working Group on Lessons Learned of 21 November;

(b) The Organizational Committee, in particular through its seven members from the Economic and Social Council category, to evaluate the practical benefits of jointly organized thematic debates on the engagement of the Commission with the countries on the agenda;

(c) The Organizational Committee, in particular through its seven members from the General Assembly category, to make recommendations on areas of practical engagement with the Assembly.

A practical approach to resource mobilization, partnerships and advocacy

53. The Commission is not endowed with its own financial resources and should be expected to help advocate for and marshal potential donors to provide financial and in-kind contributions for countries on its agenda. The ability of the Commission to fulfil this role has been made particularly difficult by the current international financial situation. The initial work undertaken during the reporting period on practical approaches to the role of the Commission in resource mobilization, as well as in forging partnerships with international financial institutes and other actors, needs to be taken forward and piloted at the country level. In particular, there is need to place particular emphasis on supporting the countries on the agenda to develop national systems that could help to attract sustainable financial and technical support.

Actions

(a) Engage foundations, philanthropic organizations and the private sector. Interested and willing members of the Commission need to be invited to provide guidance on how it could possibly utilize national networks and connections to link up with relevant foundations and private investors. The Commission also needs to explore drawing on expertise in this area from different entities in the United Nations system;

(b) Take forward the initial outcome of the mapping of resource flows and actors in Guinea, with a view to facilitating the eventual development by the Government of Guinea of its national aid management and coordination systems. Explore the possibility of conducting similar mapping exercises in other countries on the agenda;

(c) Follow-up with AfDB on joint initiatives to align the work of AfDB and the Commission behind nationally identified peacebuilding priorities in the Central African Republic, Guinea, Liberia and Burundi, as well as collaboration on specific peacebuilding priority themes for these countries;

(d) Follow-up with the World Bank on the opportunities for improved alignment of its respective engagement and collaboration at the field level. Drawing upon country-specific experience, identify specific examples of collaboration that could be further scaled-up and broadened;

(e) Draw lessons from the most recent resource mobilization exercises where the Commission has been involved and update the options paper prepared by the Peacebuilding Support Office in 2012 with a set of lessons and practices.

Forging coherence

54. The alignment of the instruments of engagement of the Commission with the activities of the United Nations and other partners in the field has proven very helpful in facilitating a coherent approach to addressing identified priorities. Moreover, existing coordination mechanisms which bring together the Government and its partners at the field-level provide possible entry points through which the Commission can contribute to coherence and coordination of actors and of resource allocation.

Actions

(a) Utilize the periodic reviews of the instruments of engagement to assess and report on the progress, or lack thereof, in the alignment of international assistance behind national priorities at the country level;

(b) Follow-up on the initial outcome of the dialogue with the Special and Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General in the countries on the agenda with a view to improving clarity on the division of roles and responsibilities in supporting the peacebuilding processes;

(c) Assess the utility of preliminary efforts to engage with Headquarters level coordination (e.g., integrated task forces, Senior Peacebuilding Group) and explore with United Nations lead operational entities ideas aimed at strengthening the flow of information and at facilitating country-specific dialogue.

Working methods

55. The ongoing improvement and further development of the working methods of the Commission will enhance efficiency and credibility in conducting its work. There is a need to build on progress made during the reporting period in enhancing the role of the Organizational Committee and the Chairs Group in ensuring a "whole of the Peacebuilding Commission" approach to its work. There is also a need to continue to focus on further improvements in specific areas.

Actions

(a) Consider the development of practical and country-specific tools to assess impacts and measure results through the periodic reviews of the instruments of engagement, including by measuring the extent to which mutual commitments are honoured;

(b) Consider options for modalities of engagement that are adapted to emerging needs in countries on its agenda, as well as to countries that may be referred for advice in the future;

(c) Consider practical mechanisms to facilitate periodic interactions among all configurations with a view to identifying common challenges, facilitate cross-learning and generate deeper interest and commitment among the wider membership;

(d) Consider further mechanisms to make Headquarters meetings more flexible. This could include a more predictable meeting calendar, reduced meeting length and better use of electronic information-sharing tools;

(e) Intensify efforts to identify standing mechanisms through which the Commission can link its activities to those of bilateral, multilateral and regional actors in the field (e.g., enhanced use of joint steering committees);

(f) Develop a communications strategy aimed at ensuring greater visibility, explaining what the Commission can offer and disseminating awareness about peacebuilding efforts and challenges in countries on its agenda;

(g) Draw on the initial consideration of part I of the compendium on working methods with a view to further develop a set of practices and methods to enhance the effectiveness of and facilitate the engagement of Member States in the work of the Commission.

Peacebuilding thematic issues

56. The Commission will continue to expand its knowledge on key peacebuilding thematic issues in which it can provide added value, either in the context of its country-specific role or its institutional advisory role. Drawing on its engagement in countries on its agenda, the Commission intends to place particular emphasis on the recurring priority areas of (a) economic revitalization, with particular focus on job creation; and (b) national reconciliation.

Actions

Economic revitalization: job creation

(a) Draw on country-specific engagement in order to identify a practical approach to supporting job creation (e.g., through private sector engagement and sector-specific support in countries on its agenda);

(b) Continue the engagement with the World Bank, AfDB and the Peacebuilding Support Office with a view to encouraging the piloting of the Global Facility on Employment Creation in Fragile Situations support to job creation in Burundi, Guinea and Liberia;

(c) Explore and identify a practical approach for promoting South-South and triangular cooperation in support of job creation and employment generation in countries on the agenda.

National reconciliation

(a) Continue support to the national reconciliation process in the context of the implementation of the statements of mutual commitments with Guinea and Liberia;

(b) Draw upon the ongoing support to national reconciliation processes in Guinea and Liberia with a view to identifying lessons learned and define the main features of its role in this thematic area.

United Nations S/2013/64

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 28 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to write to you in reference to document S/2013/10 dated 2 January 2013 regarding matters of which the Security Council is seized and the stage reached in their consideration.

In this connection, I have the honour to inform you that upon instructions from my Government, Tunisia requests the retention of the following items, listed in paragraph 3 of the above-mentioned document:

67. Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

70. Letter dated 19 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed Khaled **Khiari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations

13-22046 (E) 290113

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United Nations S/2013/65

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 28 January 2013 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as President of the Security Council, I am forwarding to you a letter dated 18 January 2013 from the Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), based on the Working Group's conclusions adopted on 19 December 2012 (S/AC.51/2012/3) (see annex).

(*Signed*) Masood **Khan**
President of the Security Council

13-22040 (E) 300113

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Annex

Letter dated 18 January 2013 from the Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict to the Secretary-General

At its 33rd meeting, on 31 May 2012, the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict examined the fourth report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka (S/2011/793), covering the period from 1 February 2009 to 30 June 2011. At its 35th meeting, on 19 December 2012, the Working Group adopted its conclusions on the situation of children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka (S/AC.51/2012/3).

In follow-up to the recommendations of the Working Group, approved by the Security Council, and subject to and consistent with applicable international law and relevant Council resolutions, including resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009), I am entrusted, in my capacity as Chair of the Working Group, with conveying the following:

> The Working Group encourages the Secretary-General to provide, at the request of the Government of Sri Lanka, the assistance of the United Nations to support efforts to provide child protection services for children affected by the conflict, including psychosocial support, community-based support and social infrastructure.

(*Signed*) Sylvie **Lucas**
Chair
Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict

United Nations S/2013/66

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 28 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to address you, in my capacity as Coordinator of the Group of Friends of Haiti in New York, in order to transmit attached hereto a joint comminuqué recently adopted by the Group of Friends regarding the situation in Haiti and the role of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (see annex).

I would be grateful if you could have the present letter and the annex thereto circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) José Luis **Cancela**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations

13-22066 (E) 300113

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Annex to the letter dated 28 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Group of Friends of Haiti

Joint statement on the situation in Haiti

The Group of Friends of Haiti in New York[a] expresses its gratitude and recognition to Ambassador Mariano Fernandez for his dedicated work as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

The Group of Friends reaffirms its solidarity with and commitment to the people and the Government of Haiti in their pursuit of stability, reconstruction, recovery, socioeconomic development and democratic consolidation.

The Group of Friends recognizes that progress has been made in the consolidation of stability, with the support of MINUSTAH, and highlights the importance of maintaining the focus on strengthening the rule of law, including respect for human rights, addressing corruption, conducting democratic elections and the development of security institutions.

The Group of Friends renews its support for the development of the MINUSTAH consolidation plan and transition compact with the objective of allowing the Haitian authorities to gradually assume their fundamental responsibilities for their country's future.

The Group of Friends strongly encourages all political actors in Haiti to deepen their dialogue and cooperation towards their country's democratic consolidation and welcomes their renewed commitment to the timely realization, with the Mission's assistance, of free and fair partial legislative, municipal and local elections, which constitute an essential and urgent step towards lasting stability, recovery and development in Haiti.

New York, 23 January 2013

[a] Members of the Group of Friends: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Guatemala, Peru, United States of America and Uruguay.

United Nations A/67/717–S/2013/67

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
31 January 2013
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 105
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 30 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you of the following:

On Tuesday, 29 January 2013, a group of Nusrah Front terrorists perpetrated a new massacre in Aleppo, carrying out in cold blood the mass execution of scores of innocent Syrian civilians they had abducted and throwing the bodies of the victims into the Quwayq river in the Bustan al-Qasr area of Aleppo. While the pertinent parties, in cooperation with the families, are still trying to establish the facts with regard to the new massacre of innocent civilians, all the indications are that the bodies of the victims were found in an area in which terrorists are active, in a shallow part of the Quwayq river that is separated by a barbed-wire fence from Syrian Arab Army positions in the Bustan al-Qasr area, around the edges of which clashes take place between those armed terrorist gangs and Syrian Army personnel stationed in the vicinity. It is worth mentioning the comment that was made by one of the terrorists who was arrested by the law enforcement forces, to the effect that the terrorists were committing their crimes before any meetings of the Security Council or action relating to Syria, in order to stir up local and international public opinion against Syria.

Several families in the area reported that they recognized the bodies of relatives that were shown on the television channels that are colluding in the shedding of Syrian blood with the claim that they were those of civilians. As usual, the Syrian Arab Army was accused of having perpetrated the massacre. The families affirmed that the bodies were those of relatives who had been abducted by the terrorists, who had previously contacted them on several occasions, demanding the payment of ransoms for them. The families said that their relatives had been abducted because they had refused to have anything to do with the terrorist Nusrah Front, and had asked it to leave their residential areas. The pertinent parties and the families are continuing to try to establish the identity of the victims of this new

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massacre by those terrorist groups, the latest in a series of brutal massacres of peaceful and defenceless civilians carried out by this terrorist organization.

The Syrian Arab Republic, while conveying to the Security Council the facts about this frightful massacre, renews its demand that the Council should assume its responsibility and issue a clear and unequivocal condemnation of these terrorist acts, which target innocent civilians, and condemn those who perpetrate them and those who provide the perpetrators with support in the form of money, materiel, training, shelter and political and media cover and encourage them to continue their crimes, which target civilian citizens, and attempt to undermine the stability of the Syrian State. Syria requests the international community to make a genuine commitment to fight terrorism and those who support it, pursuant to the provisions of the relevant counter-terrorism-related Security Council resolutions, foremost among which is resolution 1373 (2001). Once again, Syria notes that failure to implement those resolutions and the employment of double standards in dealing with them brings into question the credibility of the Security Council in fighting this perilous scourge, which is a threat to every country in the world.

Finally, the Syrian Arab Republic notes that when certain Security Council members obstruct the issuance by the Council of a clear condemnation, as has happened on previous occasions, the terrorists are given political cover that encourages them to commit more of these terrorist outrages. Syria therefore requests the States that are hindering the Council from carrying out its duties, mandate and responsibilities in this field to retreat from that position, which does not serve global security, peace or counter-terrorism efforts.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 105, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic